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Abstract—We present a secure approach for maintaining and
reporting credit history records on the Blockchain. Our ap-
proach removes third-parties such as credit reporting agen-
cies from the lending process and replaces them with smart
contracts. This allows customers to interact directly with the
lenders or banks while ensuring the integrity, unmalleability
and privacy of their credit data. Most importantly, each cus-
tomer is given full control over complete or selective disclosure
of her credit records, eliminating the risk of privacy violations
or data breaches such as the one that happened to Equifax
in 2017. Moreover, our approach provides strong guarantees
for the lenders as well. A lender can check both correctness
and completeness of the credit data disclosed to her. This is
the first approach that is able to perform all real-world credit
reporting tasks without a central authority or changing the
financial mechanisms.
Index Terms—Credit Reporting, Smart Contracts, Blockchain
1. Introduction and Preliminaries
In this section, we first provide a high-level overview of
both smart contracts and credit reporting services. Then, we
discuss some of the problems that currently exist in real-
world credit reporting and argue that these can be mitigated
by decentralization and migrating to smart contracts.
Blockchain. Blockchain was initially used as a means to
achieve global consensus about peer-to-peer cryptocurrency
transactions in Bitcoin [1]. However, the technology itself
is capable of much more than just verifying transactions.
Specifically, one can include scripts in transactions, forcing
a consensus about the outputs of these scripts. Bitcoin allows
simple scripting in a Forth-like loop-free language [2]. A
script in a Bitcoin transaction is essentially a program that
sets the conditions one must satisfy in order to use the
currency units stored in that transaction. For example, a
script might ask for a digital signature to gain access to
the funds.
Ethereum and Smart Contracts. Ethereum is a cryptocur-
rency that allows stateful scripts of arbitrary, i.e. Turing-
complete, complexity [3]. It provides an ecosystem for the
development of decentralized applications, called smart con-
tracts, that are executed and verified by the whole Ethereum
network. A smart contract can be created by anyone and is
stored in a bytecode format on the Blockchain. After its cre-
ation, the contract can save data in its own dedicated storage
and hold, receive and transfer funds (cryptocurrency units)
from/to other people or contracts. It can also interact with
other contracts and even create new ones. However, the state
and actions of the contract are all controlled by its code and
subject to consensus using the Blockchain protocol. After
its deployment, one can only interact with a contract by
calling its functions which perform actions as programmed
by its creator. These characteristics, and the inherent lack
of a centralized authority in the Blockchain, make smart
contracts ideal for implementing a variety of unbreakable
financial agreements. For example, a smart contract called
BitHalo replaces trusted third-parties and provides escrow
services [4]. We provide another simple example below.
Example. Consider the contract in Figure 1. This contract
rewards anyone who can invert a SHA256 hash value. It
is written in Solidity which is a widely-used language for
programming Ethereum smart contracts and can in turn be
compiled to Ethereum bytecode [5]. The contract creator
should provide a value for the parameter _hashed of the
constructor function, which will be stored in the contract.
She can also pay some (possibly zero) amount to the contract
when creating it. This is signified by the keyword payable.
After the contract is deployed, anyone can call the function
claim and provide an initial value. The contract checks
whether this value has the required hash and if so, pays the
person who called the function, i.e. msg.sender, with all
the money the contract holds, i.e. this.balance. Note
that all changes to the state of the contract, along with
the messages (function calls) that caused them are stored
permanently on the Blockchain and can be read by anyone.
Therefore, one can check the contract’s balance before at-
tempting to solve the puzzle. Also, after the puzzle is solved,
anyone, including the creator of the contract, can read the
function call and parameters that led to a solution. This
means that while contracts enable us to reach a consensus
about the state of a computation, they are not very good at
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hiding data.
contract HashInvert
{
bytes32 hashed;
function HashInvert(bytes32 _hashed) payable
{
hashed = _hashed;
}
function claim(bytes32 _initial)
{
if(sha256(_initial)==hashed)
msg.sender.send(this.balance);
}
}
Figure 1. A Solidity contract that rewards finding a value with a given hash
Credit Reporting. A credit report is a document that in-
cludes data regarding a person’s history of managing credit.
This data is collected and maintained by a credit reporting
agency and used to assess the creditworthiness of the indi-
vidual when she applies for new credit. It usually contains
the following information [6]:
• Identifying information, such as the name, address
and social security number, of the individual.
• Information reported to the credit reporting agency
by creditors, such as banks and debt collection agen-
cies, regarding details of current and past loans,
leases, credit report requests, utility and medical
bills, etc. We refer to each of these as a credit
account.
• Data collected from public records, such as
bankruptcy information.
Credit Reporting Industry. The companies that compile
the credit report are known by various names in different
countries. For example, they are called Credit Bureaus in
the US and Credit Reference Agencies in the UK. We shall
call them CRAs in the rest of this paper. These companies
compile credit data and help future lenders decide about
extending credit. There are three major CRAs in the US.
In 2003, they issued 2 million credit reports each day and
each of them was estimated to hold data about roughly 1.5
billion credit accounts belonging to 190 million individuals
[6]. One of them, Equifax, reported a revenue of nearly $850
million in the third quarter of 2017 [7].
Problems with Credit Reporting. It should come as no
surprise that the fact that CRAs are collecting and storing
vast amounts of sensitive data about hundreds of millions
of people is a source of concern for many. To address these
concerns, laws and regulations are passed to ensure that
the rights of individuals to privacy and fair treatment are
not violated. One example is the US Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA) of 1970. However, there are still a variety
of problems that cannot be addressed by regulation alone.
These include:
• Long Update Intervals. CRAs generally receive in-
formation from creditors and other sources once a
month and it takes them up to seven days to update
the records [6].
• Identification Problems. The data received by the
CRAs does not always include uniquely-identifying
information and might be erroneously attributed to
the wrong individual [8]. Another related aspect of
this problem is identity theft. It was estimated that
12 percent of Americans were victims of identity
theft in the 5-year period ending in 2003 [9].
• Errors and Inconsistency. Reports stored by differ-
ent CRAs can be inconsistent or contradictory [8].
Moreover, it is estimated that as many as a third of
all credit reports might contain errors that can lead
to denial of access to credit [6], [10].
• Endemism. Credit data is usually tied to a single
country or jurisdiction. The CRAs cannot access
foreign credit information [6]. This means that when
an individual relocates to a new place, her credit
data is effectively erased and her record starts from
scratch.
• Data Breaches. Finally, a major source of discomfort
is the possibility of data breaches and unauthorized
access to the sensitive credit report information. In
a famous catastrophic case in 2017, hackers stole
sensitive information about 143 million people in
the US from Equifax [11].
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose an approach
based on smart contracts that can remove the CRAs from the
lending process and fixes all the problems mentioned above.
In our approach (i) data updates take only a few seconds,
(ii) identification problems are entirely avoided, (iii) there
is no possibility of inconsistency, (iv) credit reports can be
used globally and (v) all sensitive information is secured by
cryptography. We also give individuals full control over their
credit report, allowing them to disclose all or any part of it
to others. From the creditors’ point-of-view, we guarantee
that the report is correct and not editable by its owner and
that the creditor can easily check to ascertain that it includes
all the data in a requested time-frame.
We now provide a high-level overview of our approach
that combines classic constructs in asymmetrical cryptog-
raphy to achieve secure credit reporting. We first recall
the main concepts of encryption, decryption and digital
signatures and then proceed with an intuitive description
of our method. A more formal treatment is provided in the
next sections.
Asymmetrical Cryptography. We assume basic familiarity
with asymmetrical and public-key cryptography, as intro-
duced e.g. in [12]. Formally, we use pairs of keys of the form
(K, k) for encryption, decryption and digital signatures. The
public key is denoted as K and its corresponding private key
as k. One can encrypt data using K and then the encrypted
data can only be decrypted if one knows k. Similarly, one
can sign a piece of data using k and this signature is
verifiable by anyone who has access to the data and K. In
particular, a function call in a smart contract always includes
the public key K and is signed by the private key k. This
means that anyone can see the function call data and its
caller by reading the Blockchain but no one can make a
fake function call on behalf of another person unless they
have access to her private key.
Underlying Principles of Our Approach. We achieve the
guarantees mentioned above by employing a combination of
the following techniques:
(i) Identity Management. We use a decentralized iden-
tity management and certification system in which a
borrower’s identity can be certified by lenders and
financial institutions.
(ii) Data Encryption. We store the credit report data in
an encrypted format, using asymmetrical encryption,
in a series of smart contracts. The encryption is such
that only the owner and creator of a record, or anyone
who they authorize by providing the relevant private
key, can decrypt it.
(iii) Links Encryption. We chain the records belonging to
each individual in a linked list whose pointers are also
encrypted. Hence, not only one cannot read a record
without authorization, but it is also impossible to find
out to whom a given record belongs or which records
belong to a given individual.
(iv) Fraud Prevention. We use digital signatures and asym-
metrical cryptography to avoid fraud. The simplified
intuition is that a credit record can be first signed by
the creditor and then encrypted using a key pair that is
shared with the customer. Then, when another creditor
wants to see the record, the customer can decode it and
the creditor can check the previous creditor’s signature
to make sure the customer has not altered the record.
The main novelty of our approach is a combination of
these ideas that makes it possible to achieve secure credit
reporting on the Blockchain. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first method that can reliably perform all credit
reporting tasks without a need for trusted third-parties and
centralized authorities, or changing the financial mechanism
of credit reporting.
Organization. Our approach consists of three distinct proto-
cols, each realized by a different smart contract. In Section 2,
we present our solution for identity management. Section 3
is the core of our approach and explains how we handle
credit accounts. This is followed by our public records
protocol in Section 4. Section 5 provides a short report
on a proof-of-concept implementation of our method that
is publicly available. We discuss some limitations of our
approach in Section 6. Section 7 is a comparison with
similar works and finally, Section 8 concludes the paper
with suggestions for future research and development.
2. Identity Management Protocol
One of the main issues in credit reporting, as in many
other distributed applications, is identity management. There
are two important aspects to this issue: first, one should
not be able to masquerade as another person, i.e. commit
identity theft, and second, one should not be able to use
more than one identity. Note that in a cryptocurrency setting
individuals having multiple identities do not pose a problem,
given that this does not entail any benefit. However, in our
setting, one person having multiple disjoint credit reports is
certainly not acceptable.
A simple solution is to create one or several central
authorities that check real-world identities and issue cer-
tificates of their validity. This is the solution used, for
example, for checking valid HTTPS signatures [13]. It is
also commonly used for managing the identities of banks,
institutions and public authorities. In this paper, we assume
that such entities’ identities can be verified in this manner.
However, the same approach is not desirable for individual
credit customers, given that it puts too much power in the
hands of the certificate issuers and they can, at least in
theory, bar one from getting access to credit by refusing
to issue a certificate.
Our proposal is to let the lenders themselves act as
certificate authorities. To be more precise, we allow anyone
to issue a certificate verifying the identity of an individual,
but we expect the lenders, who are typically banks and
financial institutions, to only take into account certificates
issued by other banks or institutions that they already trust.
Given that the lenders trust data sent by other lenders to
the CRAs, which includes identifying information about the
owners of credit accounts, it is expected that they agree
to accept this same information directly, i.e. without the
CRAs as middlemen, too. While this approach might lead
to a situation where a few banks perform most of the
certifications, this is not considered to be a problem, since no
group of institutions have a monopoly on certification and
every lender who is willing to extend credit to an individual
can also certify her identity.
Data Fields of the Identity Management Contract.
We now describe our identity management protocol more
formally. Our approach is realized by a single instance of a
smart contract that keeps track of every individual by storing
the following data:
• The public key used by the individual.
• Fingerprint. A unique identifier that can be used in
real world to check the individual’s identity. This can
be biometric data or any other data that is unique to
the individual. Our approach is not dependent on
the exact standard that is used for creating finger-
prints, but they should be standardized. If this data
is sensitive, one can store a hashed version of it.
For example, we can use a hashed version of the
individual’s country of nationality, appended with
her national identification number (or social security
number in case of the US).
• Two Pointers. A pointer to the first public record
of the individual and another one to her first credit
account. These will be discussed in more detail in
the next sections.
• Certificates. A list of public keys of individuals or
institutions who have verified this identity in the real
world.
Figure 2. Interactions between an individual, an institution and the identity
management contract. Numbers denote the order in which the actions are
taken.
Functions of the Identity Management Contract. We now
describe how our identity management smart contract works.
This is summarized in Figure 2. Anyone can register in this
contract by calling the register function and providing
her own desired public key and (possibly fake) fingerprint.
The contract even allows several public keys to be registered
as corresponding to the same fingerprint. After a public key
and its corresponding fingerprint are added to the contract,
anyone can call the function certify and announce that
they have checked an identity in the real world and would
like to certify it. In this case, the caller’s public key is
added to the list of certificates. There is also a decertify
function that can be used to revoke the certification.
Safety against Sybil Attacks. Effectively, one can create
as many fake identities and certify them with as many self-
created keys as she wishes. However, the lenders would only
consider certificates from other trusted lenders or institu-
tions. Such an institution would (i) ask the individual to sign
a random piece of data using the private key corresponding
to the desired public key to ensure that she has access to
it, (ii) require real-world verification of the fingerprint, and
(iii) require that no other public key is already certified as
corresponding to the same fingerprint by another trusted
institution. Only when all of these conditions are met would
the institution certify the identity.
Legal Guarantees. Note that the institutions, such as banks,
have publicly announced public keys and will be subject
to legal action, under FCRA or similar regulation in other
countries, should they provide false certifications or decer-
tifications. The process is also uniquely transparent, given
that all changes to the contract are permanently recorded
in the Blockchain. An individual can ask each lender she
deals with to certify her identity so that the respective credit
account is also trusted by future lenders.
Privacy. Our protocol preserves user privacy. The fingerprint
is associated with a public key that does not appear in
the credit accounts, ensuring that even having access to a
person’s fingerprint cannot be used to extract information
about their non-public credit records. In the next sections,
we will show that an attacker with access to the Blockchain
cannot read data about the records, such as account details,
and is even unable to infer the owner of a given record.
3. Credit Accounts Protocol
We now turn to the core of our approach, which is a
protocol for storing credit accounts’ data. We introduce a
smart contract for modeling credit accounts. Each account is
realized by one instance of this contract. This is in contrast
to Section 2 where all identities were stored in a single
instance of the identity management contract.
As mentioned earlier, we rely on asymmetric (public-
key) cryptography. To achieve the desired level of security,
we will introduce several new keys in this section. There-
fore, to avoid confusion, we use the term “true identity” to
refer to the key pair which is publicly known to belong to
an institution. Similarly, an individual’s true identity is the
key pair with which she registers in the identity management
protocol and for which she obtains certificates. Also, we use
upper-case K for public keys and lower-case k for private
keys.
We store a singly linked list of each individual’s credit
accounts, with each account providing a pointer to the next.
Note that in Ethereum each deployed instance of a smart
contract is uniquely addressable and therefore these pointers
are well-defined. The identity management contract provides
a pointer to the first credit account. Moreover, these pointers
are encrypted, as explained below, and hence they can only
be traversed if the individual owner allows it.
Figure 3. Each credit account is stored in its own instance of the credit
account contract. The arrows denote encrypted pointers.
We now proceed to define the data stored in a credit ac-
count contract and the process for its creation, management
and use as part of a credit report.
Key Generation. Let the institution’s true identity be
(Ki, ki) and the customer’s true identity (Kc, kc). When,
after verifying a customer’s identity and credit record, an
institution agrees to extend credit to a customer, they ask
her to create a new key pair (K ′c, k
′
c), called customer’s
account-specific keys. The institution in turn creates its
own account-specific keys (K ′i, k
′
i). Then, each side pro-
vides the other side with their account-specific public key.
Finally, they create and fully exchange two other pairs
of keys (K ′s,1, k
′
s,1), (K
′
s,2, k
′
s,2), which we call account-
specific shared keys. Hence, the keys are distributed as in
Figure 4.
Figure 4. Key distribution prior to deployment of a Credit Account Contract
Contract Creation. At this point, the institution creates a
new instance of the credit account contract and publishes
it on the Blockchain. Figure 5 shows the data stored in
this contract and the conditions enforced by the contract
for changing this data. The contract stores public keys of
the customer and the institution, i.e. K ′c and K
′
i. These
are set at the beginning and are not changeable afterwards.
Note that the contract does not store true identities, but
uses contract-specific public keys instead. All function calls
are also performed using contract-specific keys. The reason
behind this is that anyone has access to the data stored on
the Blockchain and one must not be able to read the true
identities using publicly available data. The contract also
has an expiration time which can be changed only if both
parties agree on the new value.
Figure 5. Data fields and constraints in a Credit Account Contract
Commitment. After the contract is deployed, both parties
must commit to it by verifiably connecting it to their true
identity. The institution does this by signing the contract
address, Ki and Kc using its true identity and adding the
signature to the contract. This signature cannot be changed
after it is added. At this point, the customer can check the
signature. If the check passes, she adds the contract to her
record by letting her last account’s Next Account field
point to this contract by storing its address encrypted using
K ′s,2. Note that the Next Account field can be changed
only once and hence the contract cannot be removed from
the customer’s report when added. The institution can now
check that the contract is added to the linked list of cus-
tomer’s report using k′s,2.
Credit Report Data. Finally, the institution can change the
contents of the field Data as long as the expiration time
has not passed. It can store all the relevant data about this
account that should appear in a credit report. This data is
always encrypted using K ′s,1 and is hence accessible to both
the institution and the customer, who know k′s,1, but not to
anyone else.
Note that we are assuming this data fits in a single
transaction of the underlying Blockchain and can hence be
changed by a single function call. This is because, to the
best of our knowledge, most credit account reports contain
only a few lines of data. However, this assumption does not
affect the generality of our approach. If the data happens
to be too big, one can store it in an external service, such
as IPFS, which is a peer-to-peer network for file storage
and transfer that supports immutable version control using
a structure very similar to the Blockchain [14]. Then one can
fill the Data field with an address/identifier of the original
data in IPFS.
Reading a Credit Report. When another institution wants
to read customer data, it would need the values of k′s,2 for
each of the contracts to be able to decrypt the links and
traverse the linked list.* These can only be provided by the
customer. Hence, one cannot find out which accounts belong
to an individual, unless that individual allows access. When
access is granted, the institution can easily find out when it
reaches the end of a report given that the Next Account
field is only empty at the end of the linked list. The institu-
tion can also see the beginning time of a contract by looking
up the number of the Blockchain block where the contract
was first created. Expiration times of the credit accounts
are publicly visible on the Blockchain, but not their data.
Should the customer decide to allow the institution to read
a contract, she can provide them with the contract-specific
k′s,1 to access the Data field** and with the lender’s true
identity, Ki, to verify the signature.
Note that an individual can add as many credit accounts
as she wishes to her linked list, acting as both the institution
and the customer. This can be used to initialize the linked list
by an account when creating an identity, and also to resist
any attempt by an institution to find out the true number of
accounts belonging to an individual.
4. Public Records Protocol
Our protocol for storing public records is similar to the
one we described for credit accounts. However, in this case
the protocol becomes much simpler, because unlike credit
accounts, public records can be made without the consent
of their individual owners. For example, a court does not
*Alternatively, the customer can provide the decrypted contents of the
Next Account fields and the public keys K′s,2. The institution can then
verify the correctness of this data by encrypting them using these keys and
checking that they lead to the same encrypted values that are saved in the
contracts.
**As in the previous case, an alternative is to provide the decrypted
contents of Data and the public key K′s,1.
need permission from an individual to add a declaration of
her bankruptcy to her credit report.
Similar to the previous section, we store public records
in a singly linked list. Each record is an instance of the pub-
lic record contract. As previously mentioned in Section 2,
there is a pointer from an individual’s identity to her first
public record, which can be created by herself.
Unlike credit accounts, the pointers used to connect
public records are not encrypted. This allows anyone to
follow the list of public records corresponding to an identity.
Moreover, anyone can add a new public record to the end of
any of these lists. This is not problematic, given that lenders
will only take the records issued by real public institutions
into account. Simply, each record is either added using an
unknown identity, in which case it can be considered as
spam and ignored*, or by an official identity, in which case
it is either correct or can be corrected by the same authority.
Again, note that all changes to the contracts are permanently
saved on the Blockchain and that official authorities are
bound by legal responsibilities and cannot simply issue false
records.
We now define the structure of our public record contract
more formally. Figure 6 shows the data fields in a public
record contract together with the constraints enforced by
the contract.
Figure 6. Data fields and constraints in a Public Record Contract
Contract Creation. The public authority creates an instance
of this contract and publishes it on the Blockchain. The
authority has access to the individual’s fingerprint and can
hence add the record to linked lists corresponding to all
identities that have that fingerprint. To do so, the authority
follows the Next Record pointers until it reaches the end
of the linked list, and then sets the final Next Record to
point to the new instance of the contract. Note that anyone
can set the value for Next Record, the only limitations
are that (i) it can be filled only once and (ii) it must keep
the linked list valid and extensible. We refer to the latter
condition as “validity”.
Credit Report Data. The other two data fields in this con-
tract, Data and Signature, are under complete control of
its issuer. Data is meant to contain any relevant information
that should be considered part of the credit report. The
*Producing spam is not free given that one has to pay for its gas
fees. This is the native Ethereum solution to combat spam and it naturally
extends to our contracts. On the other hand, when reading the records, one
can differentiate spam entries pretty fast, by simply checking the identity
of their signatures. Note that reading the blockchain is free but writing to
it is not.
authority can decide whether to fill this data without encryp-
tion, hence allowing public access to it, or encrypt it using
Kc, so that it is only accessible by the individual owner
herself. In the latter case, the authority signs the original
unencrypted Data and stores this signature in the contract.
This ensures that the individual owner can both read and
prove what is saved in Data and is the only person, other
than the public authority, who can perform these actions.
Reading a Credit Report. When an institution decides to
read the public records of an individual, it simply follows
the linked list, ignoring any entries created by unknown
identities. In case it faces an encrypted entry by a trusted
public authority, it asks the individual owner to decrypt the
Data field and provide the decrypted text. It then checks
the signature to make sure that the text was not changed by
the owner.
Importance of Validity. Except for the validity condition,
all other aspects of our public records protocol are simpli-
fications of those used for credit accounts. When dealing
with credit accounts, the pointers used for our linked list
were filled by the individual who owned them and there
was no fear that she might intend to destruct the whole
linked list. Also, the signatures provided by the institutions
guaranteed that one cannot add another person’s record
to her linked list without getting caught. However, in the
case of public records, anyone can add a new element to
the linked list and fill the Next Record fields. These
fields remain immutable after they are first filled. So, a
natural attack would be to fill them with invalid pointers,
i.e. pointers that do not hold the address of a valid contract
of the same type. This will make it impossible for others to
keep adding records. Another malicious behavior is adding
the same instance of a record to the linked lists belonging
to two different individuals. This will effectively merge the
two lists. It is therefore of utmost importance to keep the
linked lists valid.
Enforcing Validity. To avoid the attacks described above,
we do not allow the individuals to create instances of our
public record contract directly. Instead, we develop a so-
called “factory” contract that can be called by anyone to
create valid instances of the public record contract. The
factory contract also keeps track of the addresses of all valid
public record contracts instantiated using it and whether they
have been added to a linked list. On the other hand, each
such instantiated contract includes an immutable pointer to
the parent factory contract. When a new contract is being
added to the linked list, it is first checked against the factory
contract to ensure it respects validity.
Checks for Adding a New Entry. Formally, when an
individual attempts to set a value for the Next Record
pointer, the public record contract performs the following
actions:
1) It first checks the value with its own parent factory
contract. If the provided value is not a valid address or
if it does not point to a contract created by the same
factory, the operation is rejected.
2) It checks that the person (public key) trying to add the
new record is the same person who created this new
record. One cannot add records authored by others to
the linked list.
3) It queries the parent factory contract to make sure this is
the first time the given record is being added to a linked
list. The parent factory contract remembers this query
and will answer negatively to any following queries
about the same record.
4) It checks that the new record has an empty
Next Record field. This is equivalent to checking
that only a single record is being added.
These checks ensure that the linked lists remain valid and
accessible to everyone for adding new entries.
Deanonymization. The fact that public records are not en-
crypted means that they can be used to deanonymize users.
For example, public records of bankruptcy often include
names of individuals and their national identity numbers,
which might be the same as fingerprints. However, the only
additional data that can be inferred by such deanonymization
is the individual’s public key Kc. As mentioned before, this
key is not saved in any of the credit account contracts and
cannot be used to infer any non-public information about
the individual. Note that the public records themselves are,
and should be, accessible to everyone.
5. Implementation
We have implemented our approach in Solidity to
demonstrate the feasibility of the ideas and structures that we
suggest. A proof-of-concept implementation, together with
instructions for its deployment and testing, is available at
pub.ist.ac.at/~akafshda/credit-reporting.
Our implementation is entirely loop-free and all of its
function calls terminate after executing a small (constantly-
bounded) number of instructions. Hence, our gas cost,
i.e. the cost one must pay for execution of commands in
Ethereum smart contracts [3], is very little.
6. Limitations
In this section we discuss some of the limitations of our
approach and ideas for addressing them.
Inherited Limitations. The goal of our approach is to re-
move the CRAs from the credit reporting process, allowing
the same financial mechanisms that are currently established
to run without relying on a middleman or trusted third
party. This means that our approach essentially inherits any
limitation of the traditional centralized credit reporting that
is not due to the CRAs. In particular, if an individual has
two (or more) provable identities in the real world, e.g. two
distinct names and national identity numbers, then she can
sign up in our identity management contract twice and
obtain certificates for both identities. Note that this attack
is not dependent on the existence or lack of CRAs and is
also possible under the current credit reporting systems that
have CRAs. Moreover, migrating to the blockchain cannot
solve this problem given that the smart contracts can only
access the data saved on the blockchain and have no way of
realizing that the same person has fake or multiple identities
in the real world.
Cryptographic Primitives. The security of our approach is
dependent on the security of the cryptographic primitives
that are used. Users must keep in mind that any data that is
saved on the blockchain is permanent and cannot be deleted.
In several protocols explained above, data encryption is used
in order to hide the data and restrict public access to it.
If/when the underlying cryptographic primitives are broken,
this data can be recovered. Therefore, it is advisable to
refrain from saving the actual credit data in smart contracts
or IPFS, but instead rely on saving its hash. This way the
data would be provable, but cannot be obtained even if the
cipher breaks in the future. The downside to this method is
that the individual has to keep safe copies of all the actual
credit report data and can only use our approach for proving
its correctness.
Legal Problems. Our approach does not intend to address
legal aspects of credit reporting. We provide a solution that
works under minimal legal assumptions, i.e. prohibition of
fraud. Wrong information provided by an institution can be
traced back to their originator who in turn has the ability to
fix them. Problems arising due to inconsistencies in laws and
regulations, especially in a multi-jurisdiction environment,
are beyond the scope of this paper.
7. Comparison with Related Works
In recent years, a variety of financial agreements and
processes have been implemented using smart contracts. The
first such contract was BitHalo [4]. It replaced middlemen
in an escrow, and allowed distrusting parties to buy and sell
goods over the internet with security and peace of mind.
Unfortunately, it was commonly used in darknet markets
such as the Silk Road [15]. Another notable example is
the concept of decentralized autonomous organizations [16].
These are organizations that are entirely governed by rules
written as smart contracts.
After the Equifax breach [11], which led to a leak of
sensitive data belonging to more than 140 million people,
several authors suggested that credit reporting can poten-
tially benefit from decentralization and Blockchain tech-
niques [17], [18]. However, no concrete approach was intro-
duced to achieve this goal. We filled this gap in this paper
by introducing a simple smart-contract-based approach for
credit reporting.
At the same time that we were developing our approach,
a startup, called Bloom, was created to perform credit scor-
ing on the Blockchain [19]. The full details of their protocol
is not published and their code is under development. We
are not aware of the exact extent of similarity between our
approaches. However, based on the Bloom whitepaper [19],
there seems to be several fundamental differences.
Our approach provides the exact same financial mech-
anisms as real-world credit reporting and our goal is to
simply remove the CRAs from the process and migrate
to the Blockchain, while keeping everything else intact. In
contrast, Bloom modifies the financial principles of credit
scoring with the goal of making credit accessible to a wider
population. It defines its own credit score and argues for its
adoption. This score depends not only on the credit history,
but also on heuristics such as the graph of acquaintances of
a borrower and whether they are willing to vouch for her
creditworthiness.
Another main difference is the role of laws and reg-
ulations. We assume that all institutions are bound by
regulations such as the FCRA and hence the fact that all
their actions are provably recorded on the Blockchain is a
guarantee that they will not provide false data, and even if
they do, they will be subject to legal action and the data
can be corrected. In contrast, in line with its goal of making
credit more accessible, Bloom opts for a method whose goal
is to allow even anonymous lenders and borrowers to take
part. This is considerably different from the current status of
credit reports where the banks and financial institutions only
take reports from other comparable institutions into account.
Finally, Bloom is susceptible to Sybil attacks, where an
attacker fakes many identities and keeps giving loans to
herself, therefore increasing her creditworthiness. According
to its current whitepaper, the solution for avoiding this
attack is having several “trusted participants” who “will
be manually vetted by the Bloom team”. This gives undue
advantage to the Bloom team and is effectively equivalent
to having Bloom as a third-party instead of the CRAs. In
contrast, a Sybil attack does not entail any benefit in our
approach.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the first solution and a basic
prototype for performing secure credit reporting with no
third-parties. In Section 1 we identified five problems with
current systems of credit reporting that can be avoided by
migrating to the blockchain. We review how our approach
solves these problems:
• Long Update Intervals. Each update to the credit
data is done via a single function call in one of the
smart contracts. Hence, it takes a few seconds to be
added to the Ethereum blockchain, and after a few
minutes one can be sure that it will not be reverted.
• Identification Problems. The certification procedure
presented in Section 2 ensures that only valid real-
world identities will be trusted by the institutions and
that each real-world identity can only be represented
by a single public key Kc.
• Errors and Inconsistency. Inconsistency can only be
caused by forks in the blockchain and disappears
as soon as the fork is resolved. In our contracts,
erroneous data added by an institution can always be
fixed by the same institution†. Moreover, the source
of such data can be provably ascertained. Hence, the
institutions are legally bound to fix it.
• Endemism. Using the Ethereum blockchain, the con-
tracts and their data can be used in the same manner
all over the world.
• Data Breaches. There is no central authority con-
trolling all the credit report data. Moreover, each
credit account is secured by its own dedicated keys.
Hence, a large-scale breach is impossible unless the
underlying cryptographic ciphers break.
There are several directions for future research and
development. A first step is creating a more user-friendly
interface, especially one that abstracts away the underlying
cryptography. Another interesting problem is to run real-
world large scale experiments to see if creditors and bor-
rowers feel comfortable with this new approach to credit
reporting. On the theoretical side, an interesting problem
would be to incorporate multi-party computations in a way
that a creditor does not need to read the credit report of an
individual directly, but can instead rely on a process that,
using data provided by the individual and the creditor and
a secure connection to the Blockchain, decides whether the
individual satisfies specific credit requirements set by the
creditor and if so, produces an unforgeable certificate of her
creditworthiness.
Acknowledgments
We are thankful to the reviewers for raising points
that significantly improved this article. The research was
partially supported by Vienna Science and Technology Fund
(WWTF) Project ICT15-003, Austrian Science Fund (FWF)
NFN Grant No S11407-N23 (RiSE/SHiNE) and ERC Start-
ing grant (279307: Graph Games). The first author is sup-
ported by an IBM PhD Fellowship.
†Note that while the contents of the blockchain are immutable, the
values of contract variables are not. The blockchain saves the sequence of
changes to these values. Hence, once an error is fixed, its history remains
in the blockchain.
References
[1] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008.
[2] Bitcoin Wiki, “Script.” [Online]. Available: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/
Script
[3] G. Wood, “Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction
ledger,” Ethereum Project Yellow Paper, 2014.
[4] D. Zimbeck, S. Donato, A. Hahn, P. Sloin, and G. Meacci, “Bithalo,
mother of smart contracts and a decentralized market for everything.”
[Online]. Available: http://bithalo.org
[5] Ethereum Foundation, “Solidity language documentation.” [Online].
Available: https://solidity.readthedocs.io
[6] R. B. Avery, P. S. Calem, G. B. Canner, and R. W. Bostic, “An
overview of consumer data and credit reporting,” Federal Reserve
Bulletin, vol. 89, p. 47, 2003.
[7] Equifax, “Equifax releases third quarter results,” Nov. 2017.
[Online]. Available: https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/
news/2017/11-09-2017-211550295
[8] Consumer Federation of America and the National Credit Reporting
Association, “Credit score accuracy and implications for consumers,”
Tech. Rep., 2002.
[9] C. M. Kahn and W. Roberds, “Credit and identity theft,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 251–264, 2008.
[10] J. Golinger and E. Mierzwinski, Mistakes do happen: Credit report
errors mean consumers lose. Washington Public Interest Research
Group, 1998.
[11] Federal Trade Commission, “The equifax data breach: What to do,”
2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/
09/equifax-data-breach-what-do
[12] J. Hoffstein, J. C. Pipher, and J. H. Silverman, An introduction to
mathematical cryptography. Springer, 2008.
[13] Z. Durumeric, J. Kasten, M. Bailey, and J. A. Halderman, “Analysis of
the https certificate ecosystem,” in Proceedings of the 2013 conference
on Internet measurement conference. ACM, 2013, pp. 291–304.
[14] J. Benet, “IPFS - content addressed, versioned, p2p file system,”
IPFS Whitepaper, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/ipfs/
papers/raw/master/ipfs-cap2pfs/ipfs-p2p-file-system.pdf
[15] IG Group, “The silk road to bitcoin: has the
crypto escaped its dark past?” Feb. 2018. [Online].
Available: https://www.ig.com/au/trading-opportunities/2018/02/05/
the-silk-road-to-bitcoin--has-the-crypto-escaped-its-dark-past--41990
[16] P. Vigna and M. J. Casey, The age of cryptocurrency: how bitcoin and
the blockchain are challenging the global economic order. Macmil-
lan, 2016.
[17] D. Floyd, “Blockchain could make you – not
Equifax – the owner of your data,” 2018.
[Online]. Available: https://www.investopedia.com/news/
blockchain-could-make-you-owner-data-privacy-selling-purchase-history/
[18] M. Taggart, “Equifax breach reminds us why we need blockchain,”
The Huffington Post, Sep. 2017. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/59b39f05e4b0c50640cd6775
[19] J. Leimgruber, A. Meier, and J. Backus, “Bloom protocol,
decentralized credit scoring powered by ethereum and IPFS,” Bloom,
Tech. Rep., 2018. [Online]. Available: https://bloom.co/whitepaper.
pdf
